Abstract: Recent case studies on European economies have analysed the evolution of aggregate series for government expenditure on education and its relation to the cyclical economic growth in the long run. These studies have depicted two different patterns of that relationship. In the case of highly developed economies, namely France, Germany and Great-Britain, the evolution of public expenditure on education shows a countercyclical behaviour until Second World War and a pro-cyclical movement since then. However, in the case of Spain a different pattern seems apparent once the post Second World War expansion phase did not change the counter-cyclical evolution of the Spanish government's efforts to improve the level of education in Spain. In this preliminary approach the Portuguese case seems to fit the Spanish pattern, leaving room again for supporting the eventual existence of an Iberic (or Mediterranean) pattern against a northern European pattern 
Introduction
Most empirical studies on education and economic growth, both cross-section and timeseries, under distinct theoretical approaches, have repeatedly proved the existence of a significant association (and causality) between the economic performance of national economies and the level of education of their population.
Long-run historical approaches concerning economic backwardness have underlined how a poorly educated, trained and culturally unaware population have been a decisive factor of persistent low productivity levels, low labour mobility, slow structural changes, slow diffusion of innovation, preventing sustained economic growth to set in. Moreover, if an eonomy, though succeeding, at last, to achieve modern economic growth is not able to overcome rapidly the human capital accumulation gap, some loss of oportunities for the expected catch up growth will be met and growth rates will be comparatively small. Portugal seems to fit well in these frames. As explained in , the human capital embodied in the Portuguese population, taking the literacy rate as a proxy, was too small till the l940s to allow a sustained process of industrialization and modernizatrion, which would only take off in the 1950s. On the other hand, though the Portuguese growth rates, during the second half of the 20 th century were among the highest ones, Portugal did not achieve similar "economic miracles" as the "Asian tigers" in the 1960, 1970s or 1980s or Ireland in the 1990s, not to mention Germany and Japan in the 1950s and 1960s, did. The existence of high levels of human capital, in a short time, and especially the ability to overcome the human capital accumulation gap are among the decisive factores accounting for the exceptional performance of these economies comparing to the Portuguese economy (Neves; Rebelo, 2001) 1 .
Meanwhile, the state has been a fundamental institution in fostering human capital accumulation, not only during the first stages of growth but even when high levels of development and high levels of GDP per capita have developed efficient market mechanisms.
We will go into this subject a bit further bellow.
Recent case studies on European economies, rooted in the systemic regulation theory, have analysed the evolution of aggregate series for government expenditure on education and its relation to the cyclical economic growth in the long run, following Fontvieille's seminal work on the French case (Fontvieille, 1976 and 1990) . These studies have depicted two different patterns of that relationship. We aim at adding here a preliminary approach to the Portuguese case and to detect how it fits into these two patterns. We are here basically concerned with the empirical results, and its basic interpretation. However this exercise raises relevant points to revisit basic topics of Portuguese economic history, namely the relative backwardness of the Portuguese economy in historical perspective and the role of the state in the process of economic growth. Meanwhile some questions and qualifications on the suggested interpretations are asked.
In section 2 some relevant questions, theoretical aspects and remarks underlying these empirical studies, will be briefly put forward against some basic specificities of the Portuguese case. The relevance of the state and of its economic policy in the provision of education will be underlined in section 3. The empirical analysis, embracing sources and methodology to compute the aggregate series used in the statistical exercise as well as its main results, will be dealt in section 4. Some concluding remarks and qualifications will be produced in section 5.
On the theoretical framework
Recent case studies on large European economies have gone through the evolution of aggregate series for government expenditure on education and its relation to the cyclical economic growth in the long run, following Fontvieille's seminal work on the French case (Fontvieille, 1976 and 1990) . From a quantitative economic history perspective, these studies are inserted, theoretically, in the development of the human capital theories that took place along the post Second World War economic boom. Actually, they depart from its more rooted, neo-classical formulations to more heterodox approaches, namely the systemic/structural regulation theory (Boyer; Saillard,1995) . The context of such departure is the transformations endured by the world economy and the economic systems since the early 1970s, related to the reversal of the previous boom phase. This fact resumed also the interest on long waves' approaches as a relevant perspective to discuss the economic performance of the world economy, both on a quantitative economic history perspective and on a theoretical perspective 2 . Meanwhile it fuelled economic theoretical dissensions between mainstream economics -including the endogenous growth theory -and several heterodox schools 3 .
1 According to recent literature on the role of education in the long-run performance of the Spanish economy, the Spanish case seems to acknowledge most of what have just been said for Portugal. See Nuñez, 1992 and Nuñez 2000 . 2 Evolutionist and, more broadly, neoschumpeterian approaches are to be mentioned as other heterodox theories underlying a long wave perspective. Innovation, knowledge, technological systems and institutions play the crucial role in their theories on economic dynamics (Freeman, 1996) . 3 However, on the subject that concerns us here most, such distinct economic paradigms as the endogeneous growth theory and the structural regulation theory -just to mention some of the most recent approaches -have produced
The case studies available concern four large European economies. France (Fontvieille, 1990) , Germany (Diebolt, 1995) and Great-Britain (Carpentier, 1999) , which have sustained their economic growth more or less early, in the 19 th century 1 , and Spain (Diebolt, 1999) , a latecomer to modern economic growth, which, like Portugal, only succeeded to joint the more developed European economies after the Second World War.
These studies have depicted two different patterns of the relationship under observation.
In most cases, namely France, Germany and Great-Britain the evolution of public expenditure on education shows a counter-cyclical behaviour until the Second World War and a procyclical movement since then. However, in the case of Spain a different pattern is apparent once the post Second World War expansion phase did not change the counter-cyclical evolution of the Spanish government's efforts to improve the level of education in Spain. Michel (1999) in its introductory chapter makes a clear presentation of the basic ideas that may explain the more common pattern just described. They concern mainly the role of education underlying the systemic regulation theory in a long run perspective 2 . Briefly:
• The type of relationship between education and growth is a matter of the changes endured by the (capitalist) socioeconomic system, which induces parallel changes in the mode of its regulation (meaning actions to encourage the progress of material productive forces and labour productivity and to overcome the periodical crises and depressions arising from the development of contraditions in the development of the economic system) 3 .
• Before the Second World War higher efforts to allocate resources to education was cyclical and located in the long depression phases (physical capital devaluation periods). Such effort would increase the value of labour force, raising its productivity and adapting it to the new requirements of the ongoing process of innovation. The new accumulation cycle, coinciding with the new boom phase and with the diffusion of innovations, would be again a period of relative intense investment in physical capital (detrimental to human capital), whose returns would be high as a result of the previous development of the labour force 4 . As such, education is a response to the demands of the productive sphere and a vital expenditure to the valuing of capital.
rather converging conclusions on the importance of cumulative improvements in education to economic development, namely that education has become a driving force of growth (Fontvieille 1990; Lucas 1988) . 1 Gerschenkron (1965) treats France and Germany as intermediate cases of economic backwardness in the 19 th century. 2 A summarized presentation of the theory is produced by L. Fontvieille in the foreword to this work. 3 For a systematic explanation of the concept of regulation and the theory of the structural regulation of the capitalist economy and its relation to long cycles, namely Kondratieff's, see Diebolt (1995: ch.1). 4 There are formulations using much more clear neo-Marxist reasonings and concepts, namely by L. Fontvieille.
• After 1945 the increase in expenditure on education is stronger during prosperity, , and its growth slows down during depression 1973 -…. This reverse situation to a pro-cyclical relationship between education and economic performance is interpreted as a change in the economic system and its mode of regulation and refered to as a process of autonomization. Education and the accumulation of knowledge is no longer a corrective factor to overcome contradictions detrimental to the accumulation process. It becomes a decisive part of the "qualitative development of men" -together with health care, sports, culture in general -a direct source of growth through a logic of its own. An increasing part of labour force is used to produce those services directly linked with the "transformation of men themselves" and inducing a significant transformation of the mode of production where a significant part of education and training in general on a cumulative, lifelong basis is not directly productive 1 .
• In a prospective approach a time will come when the mode of regulation inherent to the " qualitative development of men" will be imposed to the "accumulation mode of regulation".
The Spanish exception found in Diebolt, 1999 is not systematically explained. However, the Spanish civil war preverse effect, the relative backwardness of the Spanish economy and "the comparative neglect of the Spanish state with regard to the development of schooling " (Diebolt, 1999: 16) are three sound explaining hypotheses.
In spite of similarities between Portugal and Spain in what concerns political developments in the last two centuries (Telo; Gómez, 2000) , Portugal did not endure the dramatic social and economic impact of a civil war. The second and the third explaining hypothesis, however, are facts that economic history investigations on Portugal have proved to be relevant issues. They will be explored below with regard to the Portuguese case.
On the role of the state
Gerschenkron's perspective on the importance of state initiatives to implement industrialization (and sustained economic growth) in the case of backward economies ________________________ (Gerschenkron, 1965) 1 , as well as the more technical approaches where endogenous growth models describe how cross-country differences in governmental economic policy account for differences in economic performance (Rebelo, 1991) , seems adequate to approach both Portuguese economic growth in historical perspective in general, as a latecomer to modern economic growth, and, more specifically, the role of the Portuguese state, and of its public finance, in providing human resources of proper quality along the last two centuries.
Moreover, this broad perspective fits quite well into the basic economic functions to be accomplished by the public sector according to the theory of public finance (Musgrave; Musgrave, 1973) : the allocation function -public provision of public goods -; the distribution function -adjustments in the distribution of income and wealth -; the stabilization function -control of the level of economic activity and price stability and its effects on employment and external balances; and, still a very important non-budgetary function, the provision of a proper institutional backgroung, including a legal structure to which economic life must conform to.
Refering to the specific case of education, there are technical reasons for the public sector to be involved in the provision of education, if not through direct provision, at least through some kind of subsidy to private sector purchases. Actually, though it is not a typical public good, but a mixed good, education spending generates positive external effects (social gains) and some kind of market failures may arise, as in the case of credit markets, which may lead to underinvestment in human capital by the private sector 1 . In what concerns distribution, education policy may help to reduce inequalities in the distribution of income, which are highly correlated to inequalities in educational investment. More equal distribution of education may reduce private gains differencials. As for stabilization and growth, public expenditure in education will produce tangible social and economic returns such as the ability to add new knowledge, to produce and diffuse technological change and innovations in general, to foster economic structural changes, inducing productivity gains, as well as more diffuse, intangible gains concerning extra-economical environment aspects.
The importance of these state economic functions may be particularly accute in a comparative backward economy as in these cases relevant market misfunctions on one hand and cultural and social rigidities on the other may arise: low GDP per capita, adding to very high illiteracy rates, may induce low demand for education consumptions and high unitary supply costs; slow structural changes may develop poor expectations on marginal rates of return of education; financial and credit markets may lack proper institutional background and ________________________ 1 Actually Gerschenkron did not have in mind national experiences similar to the Portuguese case, when he developed its theory on economic backwardness in the 19 th century.
sufficient diversification and flexibility to support private investment in education. All this may lead, as was the case of Portugal (Reis, 1993 , Ramos, 1988 , Ramos 1998 , Grácio, 1998 , to a very slow initial process of accumulation of the stock of human capital (Domingos, 1999) unless political will breaks through basic vicious circles.
On the empirical analysis

The available series
As a result of the research undertaken during the last two decades into the contemporary Portuguese economic history, a significant qualitative and quantitative improvement in the production of long, homogeneous and comparable statistical series on aggregate economic variables is apparent. Most of them have recently been gathered in a rather comprehensive collection of Portuguese historical statistics (Valério, coor., 2001) , much in line with similar information available for many national economies for a long time. The retrospective long series on public finance, namely on public expenditure, on national accounts, namely on gross domestic product, on price indexes and GDP deflators -the ones that will concern us here most-are among the aggregate series that have been recently produced and extensively used to enlight and refute traditional views on the Portuguese economic performance during the last two centuries. Nevertheless, the best series available for Portugal are not yet as sound, as long and as diversified as similar ones existing for many other European economies, a fact that may jeopardize the results and conclusions of this paper.
Public expenditure on education
The aggregate long series on public expenditure (total and on education) taken for this analysis and reproduced in apendix 1, are included in (Mata, 2001) 
Gross Domestic Product and its deflator
We are using the new series of Portuguese retrospective national accounts, namely
Gross Domestic Product at current prices, published in 
Empirical results
Growth of expenditure on education
The series of state expenditure on education for Portugal show (see figure 1 below) , for the period 1851-1993 (142 years) -almost a century and a half since the middle of the 19 th century -, an average annual growth rate in volume, taken from the exponential adjustment 2 , of 5.2%, a significant rise in line with the evolution of similar series for other economies such as France or Germany, which show also high rates for very long periods: 4.42% (172 years) for France (Fontvieille, 1990 :321), 6.25% (161 years) in the case Germany (Diebolt, 1986:468) 3 .
Again, in similarity with these cases, state expenditures on education in Portugal display alternate phases of slow growth (and even negative growth) and phases of rapid growth.
However, a Kondratieff pattern in the evolution of this variable, which is apparent in the refered cases, is hardly (much less) conspicuous in the case of Portugal, specially during the 'long' 19 th century.
Two different type of factors may account for this. On one hand, Portugal failled both to sustain its growth and to deepen its integration into the world economy till the First World War. After three decades (1860s-1880s) of some growth, notwithstanding very sharp, shortrun crises, typical of a traditional economy, there came an almost stagnating period from the 1890s on, in what concerns average standards of living. In all, a very small annual average rate of growth of GDP per capita adding to no significant structural changes (Nunes, 2001) . As for the degree of integration of the Portuguese economy in the world economy, Reis, 1984, O'Rourke; Williamson, 1997 and Fontoura; Valério, 2000 , have shown how comparatively small it was, till the interwar period, especially for such a small economy.
On the other hand, most of the second half of the 19 th century was the period of implementation of the so called "liberal blueprint (Mata, 1988) . Most of the public financial efforts was focussed in promoting material infrastructures, namely transportation and communication, ending up in serious financial problems (partial bankrupcy in the early 1890s), whose negative effects would last several decades, forcing the state to reduce its investments and to face harder borrowing conditions Valério, 1993) .
From the First World War on, however, a counter-cyclical path, close to the pattern of the Kondratieff cycles, becomes more apparent. Actually, during the interwar period state expenditure on education in volume grew at an average growth rate much above the growth rate in the trend -12.1% as against 5.2% 1 . This was the period when, the First Republican governments and the Estado Novo alocated a comparatively significant part of their income (averaging 9% of total public expenditures comparing to a mere 3% in preceeding decades) in promoting education, especially primary education. In this period the literacy rate increased from 25% (1910) to 41% (1940) , overcoming a threshold to achieve modern economic growth. The same happens after the late 1960s when the depression phase of the 4 th Kondratieff cycle was in its onset -the average growth rate of 10.6% for the period 1968-1993 -corresponding to an increasing effort of public finance to more than 13% of total public expenditures. In this phase, several reforms concerning education enlarged the number of years of compulsory education (9 years in 1986) and especially after 1974 the number of students concluding the different degrees increased significantly. On the contrary, during the expansion phase after the Second World War, when Portugal at last succeeded in sustaining its economic growth and began a rapid catching up process towards the most developed economies, the state effort towards education, according to its expenditures on this item, was relatively mild -6 % annual growth rate, slightly above the long-run average growth rate -, corresponding actually to a stagnating effort in terms of public expenditure, especially in the 1960s. In this period, though some important education reforms were implemented in the late 1940s 2 and, in particular, in the 1950s leading to important achievements in this field -such as an apparent increase in the average years of schooling in the late 1950 (Domingos, 1999: 381) and the actual implementation of a four year compulsory education system after 1956 -they did not represent a similar effect in terms of public expenditures on education. The main reasons for this were the reduction of ________________________ 1 Actually a turning point may be detected from the second half of the 1900s related to the so-called "republican blueprint", which would be clearly implemented after the First World War (Mata, 1988) .
unitary supply cost of primary education under a pragmatic effort to eradicate illiteracy 1 and an increase in the private supply of education (namely in the secondary degree), Barreto, 1995. Summing up, the counter-cyclical pattern seems to exist after the First World War and to persist after the Second World War in the case of Portugal in similarity to the Spanish experience. Taking the evolution of the ratio of state expenditure on education to total public expenditure (including public debt service), most of the basic fluctuations just described are confirmed or underlined (see figures 2 and 3 below). To the low level and almost stagnating evolution of the volume of public expenditure on education during the second half of the 19 th century (figure 1) adds, significantly, a very clear reduction of the relative importance given to education by the governments among all its commited functions till, at least, the last years of the first decade of the 20 th century, or, more pessimistically, to the post First World War 1 , as explained in section 4.2.1 above. This fact is certainly a relevant reason to account for the inability of Portugal to sustain its economic growth before the First World War (Reis, 1993;  O'Rourke; Williamson, 1997) and blames the 19 th century Portuguese governments for allocating such reduced means to human capital, probably much behind its actual, though small, financial resources (Reis, 1989) . From 1918 to the late 1940s the ratio of state expenditure on education to total public expenditure increased significantly (from 4-5% to 9%) -even taking into account the recovery from the decreasing fluctuations during the two war periods -, specially in the 1920s and in the second half of the 1940s. The implementation of the Republican blueprint, specially fell in the 1920s, meant a significant increase in the effort awarded to education (specially primary education), which was kept for practical effects by the early years of the Estado Novo, and was, much probably, one of the important elements in the setting of pre-condition to sustain growth in a few decades . However, during the 1950s the ratio almost stagnated while it actually felt below the trend 2 during the 1960s (corresponding to a decrease of the expenditure on education to total expenditure to some 7-8%). This was the decade when Portugal consolidated its industrialization and modernization process attaining the highest annual growth rates ever and the world economy was also in an expansionary phase. Since the 1970s the state seems to have increased its relative effort to improve education (dedicating some 14% of its expenditures to education), especially during the 1970s (even before 1974) which brought about the massification and democratization of the education system, with disputable qualitative long-term effects. During the 1980s and early 1990s, however, the ratio remains below the exponencial long term regression line. 3
The fall in the relative importance of of education expenditure to total public expenditure during the last years of the First World War, back to almost its lowest ratios in the turning of the 19 th to the 20 th centuries, may be reasonably considered as an inevitability in the context of the war economy. Portugal entered the war in March 1916, which brought about a change in the structure of public expenditure detrimental to such items as education, health and in favour of defence, support to some specific economic activities including efforts to overcome scarcity problems. 2 Ln(EE/TE) = -27.343 + 0.15 t; EE/TE = expenditures on education to total expenditures. df= 136; r = 0.868; r' 2 = 0,751; t = 20. 278 (0.0001); F = 411.179 (0.0001). 3 A recent study on the education expenditure in Portugal for the 1990s suggests that "(…) the gap in educational attainment in Portugal may not be due to inadequate levels of spending, but to how efficiently that spending is FIGURE 2 translated into educational output." (Clements, 1999:22) . Actually the dropout rates and the repetition rates are extremewly high in the OECD context 
Concluding remarks
The first final observation to be underlined concerns the relevant time span of the analysis in the case of Portugal. As Portugal has only entered modern economic growth and become significantly more integrated into the world economy -at least as far as trade is concerned -after the Second World War, the Kondratieff approach for a very long run study, namely from the middle 19 th century seems misfit in the context of this subject, specially for international comparisons. At best, it may be reasonable to observe Portuguese experience back from the interwar period when some important pre-conditions for sustaining growth have actually been set 1 , despite the controversial aspects of the economic policy implemented by the authoritarian regime to stimulate economic development after the late 1920s 2 .
________________________ 1 Higher integration in the world economy (Fontoura; Valério, 2000) , the attainance of the literacy threshold -40% of the total population - ; higher public investment in infrastructures and social overhead capital (Brito; Nunes, 1992) are to be mentioned. 2 Some institutional aspects of the corporatist state, the ideological backgroud of the authoritarian regime of Estado Novo, are supposed to have reduced innovation and the flexibility of the economy, through internal (and external) proteccionism, namely the 'industrial conditioning', (Neves, 1996) . A related aspect concerns the fact that in the case of relative backwardness, and especial when education levels are very low, as in the case of Portugal (and Spain) still many years after the Second World War, it is rational to expect that the autonomization process of the educational attainment, refered to in section 2, may be delayed as the axioms of the theory become mitigated or softened. Low GDP per capita and low levels of education -as in the early phase of modern economic growth -will probably imply the absence of stimuli to the increase of educational consumptions. Meanwhile, the relatively slow change in the nature of the economic system and its mode of regulation, for which the authoritarian regime, ruling from the thirties to the middle 1970s, contributed 1 , may also account for the prevalent counter-cyclical behaviour of education expenditures on education in the Portuguese case till the present time. evolution of government expenditure on education and its relation to the cyclical economic growth in the long run.
Maybe, it takes the time of two Kondratieff cycles for a national economy to mature the process of modern economic growth and its integration process into the world capitalist economy so that it may respond fully to the ongoing transformations in the economic system, and inherently, in its mode of regulation, ending up displaying the typical pattern of a very developed economy.
Again, further reasearch on the eventual existence of an Iberic (or Mediterranean)
pattern against a northern European pattern seems to be tempting.
